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Abstract In this paper phenomenological descriptions of
the experiential structures of suicidality and of self-deter-
mined behaviour are given; an understanding of the pos-
sible scopes and forms of lived self-determination in
suicidal mental life is offered. Two possible limits of lived
self-determination are described: suicide is always experi-
enced as minimally self-determined, because it is the last
active and effective behaviour, even in blackest despair;
suicide can never be experienced as fully self-determined,
even if valued as the authentic thing to do, because no
retrospective re-evaluation from some future vantage is
possible. The phenomenological descriptions of the possi-
ble scope of lived self-determination in suicidality, pre-
sented in this paper, should prove to be extremely helpful
in three different fields of interest: (a) ethical debates
regarding the pros and cons of autonomous or heterono-
mous suicide; (b) clinical day-to-day practice with respect
to treating suicidal people; (c) people who suffered a sui-
cidal crisis, attempted suicide or lost loved ones through
suicides. (155 words).
Keywords Agency  Autonomy  Conduct of life 
Experience of being rescued  Minimal sense of
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Introduction
In this paper I will develop a fair description of the
structure of suicidal mental life and of lived self-deter-
mination from the first-person-perspective applying a
phenomenological method. This should allow us to
achieve a profound description of the intricate linkages
between a person’s sense of self-determination and her
suicidal state of mind. In other words: it should be pos-
sible to describe the scope of experienced self-determi-
nation in suicidality. Basically, I will draw attention to
three theses:
1. Suicide, or the option to kill oneself, is only (pre-
reflectively) valued as attractive or worthy to achieve,
if the pertinent person is despaired, hopeless or
helpless or suffering from psychache. Basically, as
will become clear in Sect. ‘‘The Experiential Structure
of Being Suicidal’’, I claim that these different terms
(desperation, hopelessness, helplessness, psychache)
try to capture the same state of mind. This thesis,
however, argues that suicidal mental life can never be
experienced fully self-determined;
2. Suicide, or the option to kill oneself, is, furthermore,
only valued and/or judged as attractive or worthy to
perform, because it is perceived as the last resort. The
pertinent person perceives, or thinks, her option to kill
herself as her last possibility to actively change
anything at all to the better. This option must be
discovered by every person for herself. It is, further-
more, an option the concerned person can only actively
perform by herself (or actively delegate to another
person to perform on herself). This implies that a
minimal sense of self-determination is always given in
the suicidal experience.
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3. The valuing of suicide as attractive or worthy to
perform need not be judged as true, or correct, from
the pertinent’s person point of view. Furthermore, to
kill oneself implies also that one will not be able to re-
evaluate from some future vantage point whether the
valuing and/or judgement that suicide was the last
option to change anything at all was in fact true or not.
The suicidal person is usually aware of this fact. This
implies that lived self-determination cannot be max-
imal, or judged as being the fullest, with respect to
suicide. All three theses are in line with the claim that
suicide is, basically, indifferent from a moral point of
view and that every suicidal act could be rated on a
polar scale between ‘fully autonomous’ or ‘fully
heteronomous’. In other words, there is neither a fully
autonomous, or ‘rational’, suicide, nor a fully heter-
onomous, or ‘irrational’, suicide. This claim seems to
be widely supported in biomedical ethics (see f.e.
Battin 2003, 2010; Birnbacher 1990, 2006; Fairbairn
1995; Schramme 2007). A description of the possible
scope of lived self-determination in suicidal mental
life could, therefore, offer support with respect to this
claim in bioethical debates. This could be the case,
although moral judgements are difficult to tackle using
the phenomenological method. I will address at least
some of these difficulties more closely in Sects. ‘‘Short
Remarks on the Phenomenological Method’’ and ‘‘The
Experiential Structure of Being Self-Determined’’, but
will limit my arguments with respect to the overall
goal of my paper. Furthermore, a phenomenological
approach seems to be of outstanding interest from a
clinical point of view. In my daily work as a
psychiatrist, psychiatric consultant and psychotherapist
I was, in fact, primarily interested in the subjective
experience as perceived by the suicidal person, but not
in ethical or moral arguments. A fine-grained descrip-
tion of the possible forms and scopes of lived self-
determination in suicidality should therefore help
professionals in their daily encounters with suicidal
people.
In order to defend both theses, I will first spend some
time (Sect. ‘‘Short Remarks on the Phenomenological
Method’’) on clarifying a few basics concerning my own
understanding of phenomenological work, discussing limits
and options of a phenomenological approach. In the next
Sect. ‘‘Introduction’’ will describe some aspects of suicidal
mental life (Sect. ‘‘The Experiential Structure of Being
Suicidal’’), drawing also heavily on findings from empiri-
cal suicidology, and, more closely, of experiencing oneself
as being and/or behaving self-determinedly (Sect. ‘‘The
Experiential Structure of Being Self-Determined’’) in
phenomenological terms. Lastly (Sect. ‘‘The Experience of
Being Self-Determined in Suicidal Mental Life’’) I will
present a description of the possible forms and scopes of
lived self-determination in suicidality. After that some
closing remarks (Sect. ‘‘Discussion’’) are presented.
Short remarks on the phenomenological method
Doing phenomenology starts, according to its founder
Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), with a step called epoche´.
This first step implies to abstain from all forms of judgement
with respect to what is given to the phenomenologist. Even
though the abstention of prejudices is, beside the need for a
certain systematization, a standard claim of nearly every
method, the phenomenologist’s abstention is a fairly special
one: the phenomenologist embrackets the so called ‘general-
thesis’ (Generalthese, Husserl) through (reflectively)
changing the attitude towards his experience. The ‘general-
thesis’ means the pre-predicative and pre-reflective ‘state-
ment’ ‘the world exists’. This ‘statement’ is the most taken-
for-granted aspect of all our experiences. In other words, we
cannot prevent to believe in the reality of the world we are
embedded into. This belief (passive doxa, Husserl) is given
automatically. To embracket the ‘general-thesis’ does not
mean that phenomenologists are sceptics. It does mean,
however, that they are interested in the way things are given,
or disclosed, to us in our conscious experience. In other
words, doing phenomenology means to describe how an
experienced givenness is given in one’s own conscious
experience. As a phenomenologist I am therefore interested
in the ‘consciousness-of-things-themselves’, as Klaus Held
reformulates the famous Husserlian claim ‘Zu den Sachen
selbst’ (1995, p. 275ff). Hence the phenomenological
method is perfectly suited to describe experiential structures
in the first-person-perspective; but it is, of course and just
like every other method, not able to describe mental life
exhaustively. To be more precise, the phenomenological
method implies a ‘methodically critical attitude’ (metho-
denkritische Einstellung, Rinofner-Kreidl, 2003, p. 90ff), a
claim in line with most Husserlian phenomenologists.
Anyway, at first sight phenomenology does not seem to
be suited for debating the question whether a suicide
should be deemed as self-determined or not. Instead, this
question obviously requires ethical reflection on abstract
moral principles or normative obligations. This way of
reflecting is, indeed, not the way of addressing moral or
ethical questions from a phenomenological vantage point.
As John J. Drummond points out in his most clarifying
introduction on The Phenomenological Tradition and
Moral Philosophy, there is another dimension in ethical
reflection. ‘‘In this dimension we investigate the nature of
moral agency itself. We reflect upon the nature of the
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everyday moral experience itself, the manner in which we
experience moral categories, the nature of the emotions and
of evaluative experience, the nature of action, and so forth’’
(2002, p. 4). In other words, phenomenology asks: What it
is like to be a moral agent? Hence the major benefit of my
phenomenological approach in this paper is to achieve fine-
grained descriptions of the possible forms and scopes of
lived self-determination in the suicidal state of mind.
Phenomenological descriptions are, as pointed out
above, descriptions of mental life from the first-person-
perspective. This does not mean, however, that phenome-
nological descriptions simply adopt the subject’s point of
view. It is therefore important to recognize that the how is
the scientific object of phenomenological investigations. In
other words, how an experienced object is given in a
subject’s conscious experience. Accordingly, phenomeno-
logical descriptions distinguish between pre-reflective and
reflective qualities of mental life. To put it differently,
there is a difference between the subject’s point of view
and the phenomenologically describable structure of men-
tal life. This difference is of outstanding importance if
addressing ethical or moral questions. To be more precise,
simply because a person experiences (values, judges) her
decision to kill herself as fully self-determined, this need
not be the case.
This indicates a second aspect rendering phenomenol-
ogy a suitable method for my task here. The phenomeno-
logical method offers a fruitful understanding of possible
correlations and associations between our (subjective)
experience, being described in phenomenological terms,
and insights into our mental life as derived from other
sciences (see Fuchs 2002; Schwartz and Wiggins 2004;
Schlimme et al. 2010c). This offer is of special relevance
for psychiatry and psychotherapy, as well as for my
approach here. The background for the relevance of this
offer lies in the variety of scientific methods psychiatry and
psychotherapy necessarily draw on. In order to study their
‘objects of interest’, which are afflicted persons who are ill
and have a disease, different methods from natural sci-
ences, social sciences and humanities have to be applied to
cover as many aspects as possible.
The phenomenological description of lived self-deter-
mination in the suicidal experience will, however, improve
our understanding of what is going on in a suicidal person.
It may therefore be helpful to comprehend the experiential
basis of normative debates with respect to topics such as
assisted suicide, suicide prevention, or suicide counselling.
In a certain sense a phenomenological approach to the topic
of ‘self-determination and suicide’ seems therefore par-
tially in-line with the famous and renowned approach to
suicide by David Hume (1783/1995). Hume was surely no
phenomenologist in the sense proposed here. But he was
interested in mental life of suicidal people, deeming this
helpful for tackling moral questions concerning the issue of
suicide.
Phenomenological descriptions of
The experiential structure of being suicidal
People usually think about suicide when in a desperate
state of mind. To put it quite simple: the suicidal experi-
ence is basically the experience of desperation plus the
knowledge of suicide as one’s last option to act in an
effective way with respect to changing or altering one’s
feelings (one’s desperation). People in despair want to
change their unbearable state of mind, as was especially
highlighted by Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) (1849/
1992, p. 11f and p. 66ff). Although Kierkegaard was
basically a religious thinker, he delivered exquisite
descriptions of the desperate state of mind (I will use the
term ‘desperate’ as an adjective to the noun ‘despair’). He
pointed out, for example, that the inherent direction
towards changing one’s desperation is not leading out of
despair. To the contrary, the desperate person has repeat-
edly found out, and her situations have repeatedly dem-
onstrated, that a positive change appears to be impossible.
In other words, all usually fruitful behaviour, and every
behaviour the afflicted person can think about, has failed
already and turned out to be fruitless. Despairingly, the
desperate person is well aware of this ‘helplessness’
(Kierkegaard 1849/1992, p. 12 and p. 66).
Various suicidological concepts reframed this kier-
kegaardian description of a desperate state of mind, coining
terms like ‘hopelessness’, ‘helplessness’, or ‘psychache’
(Beck et al. 1986, p. 266f; Shneidman 1993, p. 50f).
Usually they didn’t refer to Kierkegaard in their empirical
works. Instead, they developed these concepts drawing on
reports by persons who attempted suicide. These investi-
gations gave empirical support for the claim that this spe-
cial state of mind can be understood as the final common
pathway in the longer process of becoming and being
suicidal. In other words, suicidal persons appear to be very
similar with respect to their desperate state of mind. In a
broad sense it is irrelevant whether one’s desperation
results from one’s loss of job or family, from suffering
from severe and chronic (mental) illness or if this desper-
ation might be prescribed by one’s depressed mood. There
are, however, subtle differences in the experiences of sui-
cidal people with respect to underlying mental disorders
(e.g. a person suffering from a borderline personality dis-
order experiences her suicidal ideation, maybe, as a reac-
tion to a feared loss of an important and valuable person,
while a severely depressed person might be suicidal
because she is delusionally convinced that her loved ones
A phenomenological approach 213
123
are better off without her). And people with mental dis-
eases are more susceptible to desperation, due to impaired
or suboptimal coping capabilities and/or enhanced chal-
lenges and challenging situations. But, not every depressed
person gets suicidal and not every suicidal person is
depressed. In other words, suicidal people are not neces-
sarily depressed (in a clinical sense), but they are neces-
sarily in a state of mind of despair.
Desperation is, in the sense used here, not simply meant
as an emotion. It is, in fact, affecting all (active or passive)
levels of mental life. For example, a desperate person is not
only feeling despaired, but her reflective abilities are
altered. This feature of suicidal people is usually named as
‘‘narrowing’’ in psychiatric and psychological models and
received empirical evidence (Ringel 1954/1999, p. 103ff;
Beck et al., 1986, p. 262ff; Shneidman 1993, p. 50ff). For
example, suicidal people tend to rethink this option to kill
themselves over and over again, sometimes even literally
unable to think about anything else. This cognitive and
evaluative narrowing is, for example, the reason why
Aaron T Beck named his concept of a final common
pathway to suicide ‘‘hopelessness’’ (Beck used this term
mainly in a cognitive sense being a cognitive-behaviourist
psychologist). And, as will become clearer later on, many
of her ‘‘valuings’’ are altered according to her desperate
state of mind (see also Sect. ‘‘The Experience of Being
Self-Determined in Suicidal Mental Life’’).
In these despairing situations the possibility to put
oneself to death offers a last and reliable option to change
one’s experience and to end one’s desperation. This is the
reason why suicide has been called a remedy. A patient I
met as a psychiatric consultant on an ophthalmological
unit, named her knowledge of suicide her ‘‘remedy’’. She
was, in fact, facing the possible outcome of blindness due
to an acute ophthalmological disease which required deli-
cate surgery. In this situation, Anne (let’s call her Anne for
a pseudonym) became despaired and couldn’t think of any
other option than killing herself, if she would in fact get
blind. She actually spent most of her time in these days
thinking about this option. It had, as she reported, a
soothing effect on her. Of course, the term ‘‘remedy’’ Anne
used could have referred to Shakespeare’s Juliet: ‘‘Be not
so long to speak; I long to die,/If what thou speak’st speak
not of remedy.’’ (Shakespeare 2008, IV, I) Anne was a
highly educated person, after all. But then, she could also
have been referring to David Hume (1711–1776), who
resurrected Shakepeare’s term in his famous essay ‘‘On
Suicide’’ (1783/1995, #8). Hume points out that suicide can
even be experienced as a ‘‘remedy’’ if death is perceived
only as a ‘‘horror’’, or, as Hume himself claims in his
Treatise, death is perceived as ultimate annihilation
removing all perceptions (2000, p. 165). It is, as Hume
argues, the effectiveness with which death ‘‘free him from
all danger or misery’’ that makes it a ‘‘remedy’’ in the eyes
of the desperate person, claiming that ‘‘no man ever threw
away life while it was worth keeping’’ (1783/1995, #8).
Anyway, Anne experienced herself as being rescued in this
knowledge, and option, to be able to put herself to death in
the case that she would become blind.
If we take a closer look at Anne’s experience of ‘being
rescued’ in her knowledge of suicide, an important point in
her remedying-experience seems to be that she was able to
put herself to death effectively and on her own account. It
is indeed this knowledge of a behavioural option which can
be named as the major difference between simple desper-
ation and the suicidal state of mind. In other words, com-
pared to being simply despaired by the danger of getting
blind, her discovery of being able to kill herself changed
her otherwise seemingly unchangeable desperation. She
now had an option for what to do if it came to the worst.
Nonetheless, Anne’s experience of ‘being rescued in her
knowledge of being able to kill herself’ differs from the
usual experience of ‘being rescued’. The latter displays
three crucial features: (1) the rescue-option presents an
infinitely ‘‘more’’; (2) the rescue is given ‘‘as and when’’;
(3) the rescue implies a deep change of the former personal
identity (see for this description: Schlimme 2010b,
p. 568ff).1 Usually ‘being rescued’ takes place suddenly,
unforeseen, and when a person is in desperate need of it. It
is, obviously, a passive experience in the sense that the
rescued person has no power over the ‘‘force’’ saving her.
And it is, furthermore, experienced as a ‘‘qualitative jump’’
out of previously restricted situations, that is: it is experi-
enced as a ‘‘breakthrough’’ to a new and different way of
living (Kierkegaard, 1849/1992, p. 61ff; Jaspers 1932/
1994, II, p. 206f). Even though being rescued allows a new
start for a better life, it is, however, not necessarily a rescue
for all times; it is, first of all, just a rescue from the current
state of despair.
1 Even though there are important differences between Jean-Luc
Marion’s understanding of phenomenology and my understanding of
phenomenological work, his description of ‘‘saturated phenomena’’ is
highly stimulating for a description of the experience of being
rescued. For him, a saturated phenomenon has an ‘‘essentially
unforeseeable character’’ (2002, p. 199f), saturates one’s experience
so that one ‘‘suffers bedazzlement’’ (p. 202f), and ‘‘appears absolute
according to relation, which means it evades any analogy of
experience’’ (p. 206f), which especially holds true in reflective
retrospect. These three features of its experiential structure can be
retrieved in the fabled description of being rescued by Friedrich
Ho¨lderlin (1770–1843), one of the most important german poets. In
Patmos he describes the connection of despair and rescue (‘‘Wo aber
Gefahr ist, wa¨chst das Rettende auch’’, trans.: ‘‘Where there is danger,
rescue sprouts.’’ (1992/1998, I, p. 463), the impossibility to catch the
experienced in a meaningful predication (‘‘Keiner aber fasset/Allein
Gott.’’, trans: ‘‘But nobody comprehends/except God.’’) and the
implication of radical change (the potentially rescuing force is also
‘‘Wie Feuer, in Sta¨dten, to¨dlichliebend’’, trans.: ‘‘Just like fire, in
cities, loving fatally’’).
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As I have argued elsewhere, suicidal people can experi-
ence (value), or (pro-/retrospectively) judge, their own
suicide as a ‘relief’, a ‘remedy’ or a ‘rescue’ in at least five
different ways: (a) the experience of one’s imaginatively
anticipated death shows death as somehow ‘‘more’’ than
can actually be expected form anything else; (b) this
experience is bound to the knowledge, or at least aware-
ness, of being able to kill oneself on one’s own means in a
self-effective way; (c) a deep (irreversible) change of
oneself and one’s situation is (prospectively) experienced
as promised to take place after one’s suicide/suicide
attempt; (d) the suicidal person can be aware of the pos-
sibility to use more or less uncertain techniques of
attempting suicide thereby tempting possible saving forces
in life; (e) a survived suicide attempt and/or coped and
overcome suicidal crisis can never be understood exhaus-
tively in retrospect, since certain, and maybe even crucial,
aspects remain to appear arbitrary (e.g. the incidence that
someone came along and noticed one’s attempt) (Schlimme
2010b, p. 568f).
Typically, experiences of being rescued imply that one
will be able to re-evaluate the experienced change in ret-
rospect from some time in the future. As the person con-
templating suicide is usually well aware of, depending on
her concept of an afterlife, this cannot be taken for granted
after having killed oneself. It is further more interesting to
notice that all three features of the experience of ‘being
rescued’ can only be found in the retrospective evaluation
from a post-suicidal-crisis-situation (the way ‘‘e)’’). Maybe
a second example might be helpful for illustrating this
aspect: In my second year as a house officer, working on an
inpatient unit for the elderly in the psychiatric department
of Hannover Medical School, I met Hans (a pseudonym).
He was 84 years old and had been involuntarily admitted to
our unit due to a serious suicide attempt. As leading motive
for his suicide he named loneliness and social isolation,
which were in fact given. His wife had already died
10 years before, and just recently his last friend from his
adolescent times had passed away. He was neither severely
depressed, nor senile or physically severely disabled due to
some kind of bodily disease. In other words and from a
medical point of view, he was well off for his age. In one of
our psychotherapeutic encounters he disclosed to me that
he experienced his rescue as some kind of wonder (which
was not far off the mark, because his rescue was in fact
arbitrary due to an unplanned visit by the priest of his
community). He was neither deeply religious, nor did he
hold any clear concepts regarding some kind of afterlife.
He didn’t expect anything special from his own death,
except to end his loneliness (‘‘And it would have ended
it.’’). In other words, this motive was still in place (though
he was not acutely suicidal anymore). And indeed, his
loneliness could not easily be altered. In retrospect he
nonetheless took his survival as a legacy to keep on, maybe
seek new friendships in his religious community, although
he clearly pointed out: ‘‘Without the knowledge that I can
do it anytime I want to, I wouldn’t go on. But then, maybe
it wasn’t the right time already after all.’’
To summarize, we can conclude that the structure of
suicidal mental life is inherently reflective in three ways:
(a) consciousness about oneself; (b) consciousness or
knowledge about one’s mortality2; (c) proved knowledge
of one’s possibility to kill oneself as one’s last option to
change one’s desperation effectively. This reflective qual-
ity of suicidal mental life does not imply that the suicidal
person could not be able to kill herself without musing
elaborately about her own mortality in that very moment.3
But it makes clear that this option cannot be given without
the reflective discovery of this behavioural option as a
possible behaviour for oneself.
More importantly, however, idealizing of or thinking
about suicide can be embedded in one’s habitualized
‘structure’. Of course, killing oneself cannot in itself
become a custom (contrary to ‘Lady Lazarus’, Sylvia
Plath). It seems, however, possible to habitualize with
respect to this behavioural option. There is, for example,
clinical, empirical and single-case-study-evidence that
people are commonly, for a certain period of time, suicidal
before committing suicide or attempting it. In other words:
They become despaired, discover suicide as an option and
usually muse about this option for a longer time. This fact
is conceptualized in Po¨ldinger’s model of different stages
(Po¨ldinger 1982). According to Po¨ldinger, suicidal people
usually live through at least two different stages before
deciding whether to attempt suicide or not. Furthermore,
repeated suicide attempts and vicarious experiences, either
directly through personal relationships (e.g. suicide as a
‘traditional family behaviour’, previous suicide attempts of
one’s peers and/or relatives) or indirectly through ‘media’
(e.g. myths and narrations, mass media, or fine arts),seem
2 Fairbairn seems to be of a similar opinion, claiming these two
conditions as necessary conditions for suicide (1995, p. 73). His third,
and also necessary as well as sufficient condition for suicide, is that
the ‘‘person who suicides wishes to be dead, intends to die and enacts
that intention’’ (p. 79).
3 It is a well-known fact that people often report to have tried to kill
themselves impulsively and without giving it elaborate consideration
or having explicitly ambiguous second thoughts in the very moment
of doing it. Yet, even though this seems to be especially possible in
adolescents, and may even be more pronounced in repeated suicide-
attempters, it is nevertheless a necessary condition to be aware of
one’s mortality in order to have this option of intentionally killing
oneself, whether in an impulsive or a highly planned way. In other
words: in order to go watching a film in a cinema impulsively, the
possibility to do exactly that must be a behavioural option embedded
in the person’s pre-conscious and habitualized ‘structure’, even if the
person is not self-consciously aware of this possibility in the very
moment of acting it out.
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to be ways of getting accustomed to this behavioural
option.4 It seems, therefore, sensible to understand this
process of getting despaired and suicidal as a process in
which the pertinent person acquires a new and, at least
partially ‘accustomed’ style of perceiving, valuing and
addressing things in her world.
While the first two characteristics (a ? b) are therefore
necessary, but not sufficient conditions (apparently we are
not usually suicidal when becoming aware of ourselves
and/or our mortality), the third characteristic is the crucial
and sufficient condition for the suicidal state of mind. It is
important to notice that it basically relies on a desperate
state of mind as a background. Both Anne and Hans, for
example, would not have perceived and valued their self-
inflicted death as some kind of ‘remedy’ (Anne) or ‘relief’
(Hans) if they would not have been despaired in the first
place. In other words, one has to be utterly despaired in
order to address and value one’s death as one’s rescue.
Being despaired can therefore be described as a pre-
reflective and experiential prescription of suicidal mental
life. Only if desperation is the foremost, or maybe even
only, style of how things are disclosed to an experiencing
subject, self-inflicted death can be disclosed in its rescuing
qualities.
The experiential structure of being self-determined
The experience of self-determination affords us more than
being the agent of a behaviour, even though we usually
experience ourselves as ‘free’ in those situations in which
we are not explicitly self-conscious. Self-determination
affords our being able to name proper reasons for our
behaviour. In other words, behaving self-determinedly
affords our being a ‘moral agent’. In accordance with the
phenomenological method, I want to present a preliminary
description of moral agency. In this I will draw extensively
on the works of John J. Drummond.
Usually we would expect that a moral agent can display
the following abilities: develop intentions for his behav-
iour; show a certain effectivity of his behaviour with
respect to his intentions; judge his behaviour independently
from his intentions; and deliver reasons for his behaviour.
As Drummond points out from a phenomenological van-
tage point, our intentions as well as our judgements can be
described as being prescribed by our various (explicit or
implicit; moral or practical ‘‘use’’-) interests (2002, p. 22ff.
and 26ff.). What is meant with this term of ‘being pre-
scribed by interests’? The answer becomes clear if taking a
closer (phenomenological) look at our experience of
immediate and prima facie valuing (‘‘Wertnehmung’’).
Because it is somewhat at the heart of my argument, it is
important to capture the difference between valuing and
judging, the latter being understood here as a reflective act,
the former being understood as a pre-reflective operation
taken out automatically in our mental life. The following
three paragraphs are devoted to describing this difference
more closely, maybe even more detailedly than actually
required for my approach here, from a phenomenological
vantage point, drawing, as already indicated, on the works
of John J. Drummond.
Following Drummond we can describe these pre-reflective
valuing experiences (‘‘Wertnehmungen’’; value-appre-
hensions; valuing without further and explicit value-
judgement) as founded on a purely descriptive ‘objective
sense’ of an experienced object as the core of this experi-
ence. Founded upon this core is a ‘feeling-moment’ in the
particular kind of act called (pre-reflective) valuing
(‘‘Wertnehmung’’). Or as Drummond has stated, the spe-
cific moment of this act is ‘‘the affective response to the
situation with its non-axiological properties’’ (Drummond
2008, p. 41). Importantly, as Drummond points out, there is
‘‘something like an abstraction at work in evaluation’’
(Drummond 2002, p. 19). In other words, only some fea-
tures of this presented (or disclosed) object are addressed in
this affective response. This is why Drummond talks about
an ‘‘affective as’’, covering with this term the simple fact
that we experience objects as something (e.g. bad, brute,
elegant, fabulous, fresh, frightening…). As Drummond
further argues, this immediate and pre-reflective abstrac-
tion, or particular selection taking place in valuing, is
prescribed by our (pre-reflective) interests (p. 22ff.).
For a phenomenological description of lived self-deter-
mination it is, furthermore, important to recognize direct-
edness as an essential feature of our interests. This goal-
directedness often remains pre-reflective, implying that we
are unconsciously directed towards specific ends. In his
‘genetic phenomenology’ Edmund Husserl coined the term
‘‘Erwartungsintentionen’’ (intentions of anticipation; Hus-
serl 1999, e.g. §21–26) for this feature of tendentious
pursuit inherent in all kinds of interests. Such intentions of
4 It is an interesting observation from various psychological studies
that the most reliable predictor for future suicide are suicide attempts
in one’s personal history or the history of one’s family (an overview,
Runeson and Asberg 2003). Following our phenomenological
description this fact can be understood as a process of habitualization
or ‘embodiment’: the more one gets familiar with a certain behaviour,
via training, mental training, or stimulating narrations, the better one
is in performing this behaviour. This is not saying that talking about
suicide ‘introduces’ the idea and elevates the risk of doing it,
especially when talking to already suicidal people. Quite to the
contrary, it can be concluded that, since every person will sooner or
later discover this behavioural option for herself, it should be highly
effective, from a suicide-prevention point of view, to debate more
openly about suicidal crises as not unusual experiences in one’s life-
span, not necessarily leading to death. This could especially include
life-stories of celebrities, who overcame suicidal crises, therefore
allowing suicidal people to model their own behaviour on successful
coping.
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anticipation can be described, from the phenomenological
vantage, as being given in our conscious experience:
whether in perception, ‘‘wertnehmen’’ (pre-reflective val-
uing), body movements, or even in complex behaviour. For
example, going to a farmer’s market, we perceive a tomato.
We immediately, and pre-reflectively, anticipate that it has
a certain kind of backside. Because we are familiar with
tomatoes, we also immediately value this tomato as ‘‘ripe’’
and ‘‘juicy’’ (being all red and well shaped). All of a
sudden we are filled with curiosity, if its backside can hold
up to what its front is promising. Since we are familiar with
our own body movements, rightly anticipating that we are
indeed able to move our hand adequately, we stretch out
our hand in order to satisfy our interest, pick up the tomato
and turn it around. Intentions of anticipation can be, of
course, either fulfilled or disappointed (‘‘negated’’, as
Husserl calls it). Fulfillment, as well as disappointment, of
these anticipations often remains pre-reflective, sometimes
maybe even pre-conscious. It can, however, be recon-
structed as ‘fulfillment’ and/or ‘disappointment’ of one’s
intentions of anticipation in explicit reflection. The tomato
we picked up and turned around can be completely green
on its backside, which will lead to our immediate valuing
of this tomato as ‘‘unripe’’. If starting to think about it, for
example, because a friend stops by and asks us what we are
doing, we would be able to reconstruct the set of antici-
pations and interests which led to the very moment in
which our friend went by. In this reconstruction we become
aware of our own underlying interests as having already,
pre-consciously, guided our perceptions, intentions and
actions. This example demonstrates that the directedness of
our various interests often remains pre-reflective, implying
that we are unconsciously directed towards specific ends
(e.g. picking up a tomato and turning it around). Being
guided in our behaviour by intentions of anticipation makes
understandable why it is only natural that we go on doing
things which we are already used to do (e.g. picking up
tomatoes and turning them around if we are interested in
buying some of them). Nothing else is meant with the term
custom, accustomed behaviour or habit (‘‘habitueller
Niederschlag’’; Husserl 1999, § 25).
In other words, our behaviour is prescribed by our
embodied selves being embedded in accustomed situations,
thereby ‘producing’ our situation as an ‘experiential
workspace’ (Talero 2008; similarly Merleau-Ponty 1944,
pp. 164ff). In this ‘production’ pre-reflective anticipations
of our capabilities guide our focus of consciousness
towards those goals which are achievable (and often,
though not always or necessarily, valuable) for us. Being
guided by our habitualized perceptions and value-appre-
hensions, our styles of thinking and behaving, does, how-
ever, not already imply that we act self-determinedly. But,
as Drummond points out with explicit reference to
Aristotle, we are indeed able to behave morally justified if
we are following virtuous customs, habits and/or traditions
(Drummond 2002, 2008; see also Aristotle 2006, 1103a–b).
Still, occurrent deliberation is often required in order to
recognize and effectively intend those actions which are in
our best interest, including our moral interests (Drummond
2008, p. 46). And indeed, we, as agents interested in
autonomous behaviour, commonly pre-reflectively antici-
pate that we would be able to explicitly evaluate our
accustomed behaviour as morally justified (e.g. from some
future point of view). This pre-reflective anticipation is
truly given if experiencing ourselves as autonomous in our
intentional actions – at least, if we don’t do something we
explicitly know to be forced to by external or internal
causes. We further take for granted that we are truly able to
perform the envisaged behaviour successfully, and to pur-
suit and achieve our intended goals. Although we are
usually not aware of this specific capability, we are indeed
able to become aware of it. Such an explicit belief in one’s
capability to perform certain actions successfully is called
self-efficacy in cognitive-behaviouristic psychology (Ban-
dura and Adams 1977). From a phenomenological point of
view, however, this psychological concept of self-efficacy
can be described as the reflective reconstruction of pre-
reflectively given intentions of anticipation (Edmund
Husserl) of one’s personal effectivity in one’s (interper-
sonal) world with respect to one’s intended goals. In other
words: goals which are valued as ‘worthy to pursuit’ are
already pre-reflectively shaped as the attractive ones
according to our accustomed capabilities (Drummond
2002, 2008). ‘‘Value-attributes are the correlates of … the
affective response of a subject with a particular experiential
history—that is, particular beliefs, emotional states, dis-
positions, practical interests, and so forth—to the non-
axiological properties of an object or situation.’’ (Drum-
mond 2010, p. 416) Such pre-reflective guidance neither
means that we simply want what we can achieve or only
want what we could achieve, nor does it imply that we
always achieve what we want or that unwanted and
unexpected effects are not possible.
So far for describing Drummond’s approach to moral
agency more closely, especially focusing on the distinction
between pre-reflective valuing and reflective judging. On
the background of phenomenological approaches to ethics
and moral philosophy, especially relying on the works of
Drummond, we can describe two forms of experienced
self-determination.
1. An often pre-reflectively experienced form of self-
determination on the level of freedom of (intentional)
action. Here, the concerned person’s underlying inter-
est is to behave effectively with respect to her goals.
This sense of self-determination equals personal
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(behavioural) effectivity in line with one’s actual
motivations and intentions, whether these intentions
are directed towards self, world or others. Furthermore,
this lived self-determination is deeply embedded and
habitualized; pre-reflective intentions of anticipation
with respect to one’s effectivity and one’s potential
judgement are commonly describable as inherent
features of accustomed behaviours in agents. However,
as has already been pointed out, behavioural effectiv-
ity, as well as implicitly assumed future judgements,
lead a person only half-way towards self-determination
in its fullest sense. Currently relevant interests of a
person can indeed be superficial, mistaken and/or self-
deceptive with respect to her deeper, underlying, or
‘true’ and authentic interests.
2. An often reflectively experienced form of self-deter-
mination on the level of freedom of the will. In this
form, the underlying interest is to be a responsible
person (as indicated above). Or, as Drummond calls it:
a self-responsible person. Self-responsibility means,
from a phenomenological vantage, nothing other than
being authentic: ‘‘The authenticity of this kind of life is
responsible self-realization, taking responsibility for
one’s convictions and for disclosing the evidence that
warrants those convictions (to oneself and to other
people J.S.).’’ (Drummond 2010, p. 423) Following
Drummond, our interest in self-responsibility (authen-
ticity) flows from ‘‘the teleological dimension inherent
in all intentional experience, the striving toward
fulfilment.’’ (p. 421) This interest in being authentic
(or responsible) can take us all the way to self-
determination, since it promotes the reflective disclo-
sure of the object of one’s valuing experience in its
relations to one’s interests. Such ‘taking stock’ of
one’s life and life-conduct with respect to one’s
deepest principles allows people to test, pro- and
retrospectively, the adequacy (authenticity) of a per-
son’s valuing in relation to her interests—not only for
oneself, but also for others. Alterations and impair-
ments of a person’s freedom of the will are, of course,
of outstanding importance for our approach here.
To summarize, we can conclude that the experience of
being self-determined has its most important pre-structure
in our experience of agency. To be more precise, freedom
of intentional action requires pre-reflective effectivity with
respect to the initiation of one’s behaviour (setting it in
motion according to one’s goals and intentions) and the
effects of one’s behaviour in the world as regards one’s
intentions and goals (Schlimme 2010a). According to
these descriptions of the experiential structure of being
self-determined, we can differentiate three domains of this
pre-reflective self-referential effectivity. They can be
described, in phenomenological reflection, in those expe-
riences in which a subject feels to be the causal and
unhampered agent of her behaviour. These domains are,
however, located on the level of freedom of intentional
action. Nonetheless, each of these domains implies the pre-
reflective anticipation of a possible active deliberation of
one’s experienced self-determination with respect to one’s
explicit (moral) values or principles:
1. A given effectivity of one’s intentions with regard to
one’s behaviour and the pre-reflective anticipation of a
positive (moral) evaluation of one’s intended behav-
iour as can be tested in prospective deliberation;
2. A given effectivity of one’s behaviour in order to
pursuit and achieve one’s intended goal and the pre-
reflective anticipation of a positive (moral) evaluation
of one’s behaviour as acceptable, as can be tested in
pro- and/or retrospective deliberation;
3. A given effectivity of one’s behaviour on oneself in the
long run and the pre-reflective anticipation of a
positive (moral) re-evaluation of one’s past behaviour
from some future vantage as can be tested in
retrospective reconstruction.
The fact that all three domains of self-referential
effectivity can be described in a certain behaviour does,
however, not imply that this pertinent behaviour will be
called autonomous, whether in prospective deliberation or
if looking back in judgemental retrospect. In fact, the
pertinent agent may not even have any proper reason
whatsoever for his behaviour. Nevertheless, he may feel
free in its performance (e.g. in so called flow-experiences).
These three different kinds of effectivity are indeed merely
describing features which are inherently given in pre-
reflectively experienced self-determination on the level of
freedom of intentional action. We may, however, act vir-
tuously and therefore morally justified.
The experience of being self-determined in suicidal
mental life
In this Sect. ‘‘Introduction’’ will draw on these two dif-
ferent kinds of distinctions, developed in the section above,
in order to describe alterations of lived self-determination
in suicidality in a more detailed way. I will, on the one
hand, focus on the freedom of intentional action claiming
that on this level most suicidal people can experience their
suicide as a self-determined act. Nevertheless, even on this
level special impairments are given. It will be interesting to
see, in which domain of self-referent effectivity this
impairment can be retrieved in our phenomenological
enquiry. On the other hand, I will focus on possible con-
nections, or correlations, of alterations in these domains of
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self-referent effectivity with impairments of free will in
suicidal mental life. I am convinced that some connections
should be found; and that the phenomenological descrip-
tion of these connections is helpful for better compre-
hending suicidal mental life in its experiential structure.
1. Suicidal acts are in most cases experienced as self-
determined in the first domain, because people who
kill themselves usually intend exactly that. There is
also empirical evidence from psychological autopsy
studies that this basically is the case (Shneidman
1993). In other words, on the level of intentional
action, suicidal behaviour could indeed be experienced
as unhindered (if it is in line with the actual strongest
interest). Of course, this cannot simply be taken for
granted from a third-person-perspective, as especially
Gavin Fairbairn argues (1995, p. 57–69). Suicidal
people can, for instance, change their minds in the
middle of their previously intended action, or after
attempting suicide. The latter is a well known feature
in emergency rooms; frequently people show up
having called the emergency line themselves after,
for example, ingestion of an overdose followed by a
change of mind. This change of mind indicates a
possible impairment in this domain, which is often
named as ambivalence of suicidal mental life. Suicidal
people may indeed remain unsure about the question
whether suicide is really their last rescue-option or not.
There are, in other words, two (conflicting) interests in
the same person at work at the same time.
There is a special kind of suicide, which demonstrates
this very clearly. It may not be occurring very often, and I
personally never ran across it in my time working as a
psychiatrist, but it has single-case-study-evidence on its
side. It was called ‘musical chairs’ by Karl Menninger
(1938), or an ‘ordeal’ by Jean Baechler (1975; Fairbairn
addresses it as ‘cosmic gamble’, 1995; 2008). In this spe-
cial case persons suspect that some other way out of their
desperation might probably show up in near future, or they
might in fact use a gambling technique like Russian rou-
lette. There is, indeed, empirical evidence that suicidal
people can have an explicit intention to survive accompa-
nying their intention to kill themselves (this has especially
been argued for people suffering from borderline person-
ality disorder, and I can give testimony to such deep
ambivalence in suicidal people). Anyway, in these cases
the suicidal person’s intention is not clear. To be more
precise, the suicidal person is at odds with herself, whether
she should really kill herself or not. We could say that she
is hindered internally on the level of intentional action due
to two conflicting interests.
Far more common is an appellative suicide gesture (‘cry
for help’, Erwin Stengel 1961; ‘suicide gesture’, Gavin
Fairbairn 1995). In this case, the suicidal person maintains
the explicit expectation that other people, loved ones for
instance, could in fact be of help. She seems to be con-
vinced, however, that it requires a ‘faked’ suicide attempt
in order to get their awareness. In other words, the perti-
nent’s person intention is primarily not to kill herself, but
to appear to others as a person which is so utterly despaired
that she actually intended to kill herself (although she
didn’t). She might even be ambiguous with respect to the
question whether she should attempt a suicidal ‘cry for
help’ or if it might be possible to acquire the required
attention on a different and less dangerous way.
Anyway, in all these cases the person’s level of freedom
of intentional action is, internally, hindered or even con-
tradicted by another motivation. All this indicates not only
that it is necessary to distinguish between a freedom of
intentional action and freedom of the will if trying to
address the topic of self-determination phenomenologi-
cally. It is demonstrating that it is of special interest with
respect to lived self-determination in suicidal mental life,
whether the person truly intends to kill herself or not (if it
is her strongest interest, if she can identify with this interest
and so forth). We will come back to this in our discussion
and, not surprisingly, in the following paragraphs in which
we deal with the other domains of self-referential
effectivity.
2. Suicide is imagined as being effective in achieving the
intended goal (‘relief’, ‘remedy’, ‘rescue’). In other
words, it would not be chosen as means to achieve it if
the suicidal person would not pre-reflectively value
and/or reflectively judge it as effective and suited. It is,
furthermore, valued as self-determined with respect to
this domain. Yet, there might be doubts whether it is
truly the best, last, or only way to achieve the intended
goal. As already discussed in the paragraphs above,
other interests might contradict the valuing of killing
oneself as being the ‘right thing to do’. Suicidal people
might, for instance, simply wish a ‘pause in their life’,
comparable to some kind of deep slumber, or they
might intend to get others attention (‘cry for help’).
Nonetheless, as already discussed above, the desperate
person’s ability to behave effectively with respect to
changing her desperation is the key feature rendering sui-
cide a ‘relief’, ‘remedy’, or ‘rescue’. It is, in other words,
the pre-reflective anticipation of this effectivity which
‘produces’ the pre-predicative experience of self-inflicted
death as an attractive, valuable and probable goal. This pre-
reflective valuing of one’s self-inflicted death as ‘reliev-
ing’, ‘liberating’, or maybe even ‘rescuing’ cannot be
easily altered self-consciously if truly being utterly des-
paired. This holds true even if a person explicitly knows, or
retrospectively reconstructs for example in therapeutic
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settings, that her valuing of her self-inflicted death as
attractive (‘relief’, ‘remedy’, ‘rescue’) is influenced by her
actual mental condition. She cannot, in other words, alter
her pre-reflective valuing profoundly on the spot. Suicidal
mental life can in fact be truly two-fold with respect to this
point: a suicidal person can ideate killing herself, while
simultaneously knowing that this ideation is partially a
result of her blackest despair which is, for example, her
actual mental condition due to ongoing and seemingly
unchangeable depression, or chronic pain, or so forth.
Exactly this kind of ambiguity is central for the well-
known and, at least from a clinical perspective, fabled
ambivalence in suicidal mental life.
Hans, for instance, knew very well that he deemed
suicide as a ‘relief’ because he was feeling lonely and left
behind (by his wife, his friends). He knew that valuable
social contacts would help him to overcome his loneliness
and that, accordingly, he would not experience the option
of putting himself to death as that attractive and relieving.
This insight, which he pronounced clearly in the above
mentioned statement, was not the result of a long thera-
peutic process, but an insight already there in the time
before attempting suicide.
Anyway, the fact of discovering the possibility to kill
oneself as an effective way to change one’s otherwise
seemingly unchangeable desperation is of outstanding
importance. This has been, for example, captured in the
term ‘‘natural liberty’’ by David Hume (1783/1995, #3),
who claimed to be thankful ‘‘for the power with which I am
endowed of escaping the ills that threaten me’’ (#5) (this
should hold true, as Hume argued, even if one would
believe in providence, what Hume didn’t do of course).
According to our phenomenological descriptions of lived
self-determination in suicidal mental life, we can admit that
there is always and in every suicidal behaviour an experi-
enced quality of self-determination (called here minimal
sense of self-determination). This means sometimes noth-
ing more than that it is the afflicted person herself who
determines, or has determined, that suicide is a possible
behaviour to effectively alter her experience of despera-
tion, her feelings of despair, her desperate state of mind.
This minimal sense of self-determination can be compared,
though this may appear rude, to our last resort of computer-
control stemming from our claim: I can still pull the plug.
Anyway, this minimal sense of self-determination in
suicidal mental life is due to its inherent reflective quality,
indicating all the time: I have discovered this rescue-option
personally for myself. It is important, however, to recall
that this subjective evaluation is not necessarily saying
something more from a moral point of view. The pre-
reflective valuing (‘‘wertnehmen’’) of self-killing as
attractive, as relieving, rescuing or liberating seems indeed
to be specifically pre-scribed by the pertinent’s person
desperation. We could suspect that this might also be the
case for reflective judgings of self-inflicted death as last
resort and/or as one’s last autonomous act (indicating an
identification with one’s pre-reflective valuings). I will
address this idea more closely in our next section.
3. Suicidal behaviour is directed towards oneself, indi-
cating a high self-related effectivity in the third
domain. Self-determination, as experienced from the
suicide’s point of view, has therefore its natural end in
one’s own death (at least in this life). Suicidal people
who muse about killing themselves are usually aware
of the radical alterity of death. Although they may not
be able to pinpoint exactly their epistemological and
experienceable limits with respect to ‘death’, they
know that their death will be irreversible in the sense
of not allowing them to re-enter this life anymore. This
does not deny that other effects on others might be
intended too, like the induction of shame or guilt in
others (‘cry for help’), or that people might have
fantasies about ‘resting for a while’.
Nonetheless, there is clinical evidence that self-inflicted
death is not valued as ‘relieving’ or ‘rescuing’ if a person is
not aware that death is radically different from life. For
example, severely depressed people with Cotard’s syn-
drome usually expect self-killing to be ineffective. Being
delusionally convinced that their body has already died,
suicide is devoid of its rescuing qualities. Piet C. Kuiper, a
renowned dutch psychiatrist who suffered himself from
repeated severe depression, reported exactly this kind of
delusionally altered quality of suicidal mental life in his
extraordinary insightful autobiographical novel on his
severe depression and recovery (Kuiper 1988, p. 85ff).
There seems to be an inherent connection between one’s
pre-reflective valuing of suicide as ‘relieving’, ‘liberating’,
or ‘rescuing’, and the simultaneous perception, or valuing,
of death as being radically different from earthly and
fleshly life. In other words, it seems to display these
qualities of ‘relieving’ and so forth, not only because it can
be performed effectively by oneself. But, it seems to be
valued as such also because it will lead to some state of
mind/oneself which is radically different from everything
going on right now. It can therefore be addressed as the last
resort even if being in blackest despair. If this is true, and
Anne and Hans would have agreed, then this would imply
that suicidal people can be aware of the fact that a personal
retrospective evaluation of one’s suicide will be impossi-
ble. In other words: they could be aware of the simple fact
that it will be impossible to prove that their suicide was
really the adequate behaviour and that it can still be called
that from some time in the future. Anne, for example, was
very well aware of this fact too. She addressed it herself, in
an, admittedly, aggressive sense, claiming: ‘‘I know, you
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could say: Look, there are so many people with even worse
disabilities than blindness, no legs, no arms and still happy.
I know. But this is not me. For me, blindness is unbear-
able.’’ She simply rejected, at least in overt communica-
tion, the fact that indeed she, being an intelligent and fairly
sophisticated woman, could learn how to live a good life as
a blind person. In other words, she knew that she, once
having killed herself, would not be able to test in retro-
spect, from some time in the future, whether her behaviour
would still be judged from her point of view as having been
justified. And, she furthermore suspected that it could well
be that she would judge it as not justified from some future
vantage point (just like Hans did, claiming that his attempt
was premature at last).
This inability to re-evaluate one’s suicidal behaviour
from some future vantage point seems to be a major lim-
itation with respect to the possible scopes and forms of
lived self-determination in suicidal mental life. It makes
the suicidal person’s explicit (reflective) identification with
her pre-reflective valuing of self-inflicted death as ‘reliev-
ing’, ‘liberating’, or ‘rescuing’ difficult. From a phenom-
enological vantage, this difficulty directs us to a description
of the most self-determined way of justifying self-inflicted
death which can be achieved. According to Anne, this
seems to be the case if the suicidal person values, and
reflectively judges, her suicide as a sacrifice for that kind of
life-conduct which she deems also worth dying for. In other
words, if she truly identifies with her pre-reflective valu-
ings also from a more distant point of view, which should
involve ethical reflection and so forth. Or, more simply put,
if her intention to kill herself is authentic.
This claim becomes clearer if recalling that we, as
human beings, are persons. Being a person implies being
able, and challenged, to conduct our lives in the way we
deem to be best. In Sect. ‘‘The Experiential Structure of
Being Self-Determined’’ we already discussed the possible
phenomenological understandings of this fundamental
human interest, drawing on John J. Drummond’s work.
‘Best’ appeared to be just another word for ‘authentic’,
which is, as I readily admit, an evenly broad concept. It is,
however, at least from a phenomenological point of view,
retrieving the pre-reflective valuing of a self-determined
conduct of life. To re-quote Drummond once again: ‘‘The
authenticity of this kind of life (self-determined kind of
life, J.S.) is responsible self-realization, taking responsi-
bility for one’s convictions and for disclosing the evidence
that warrants those convictions (to oneself and to other
people, J.S.).’’ (Drummond 2010, p. 423) In other words,
lived self-determination in suicidal mental life reaches is
highest standard, only if a person deems her own death,
either self-inflicted or personally risked, to be a way of
disclosing the evidence that warrants her convictions to
mankind, and herself, in prospective deliberation.
According to these phenomenological descriptions the
following four statements are possible:
1. One experiences one’s (self-inflicted) death only as
one’s last rescue, if one is utterly despaired;
2. The aspect of an effectively achievable change (unde-
niably given in death) is crucial with respect to the
rescue-quality of one’s death in a desperate state of
mind, but implies that suicidal behaviour can never be
experienced as self-determined in a full sense (e.g.
impossibility to fulfill the pre-reflective intentional
anticipation of retesting whether one’s suicide was
really justified);
3. In every suicidal experience a minimal sense of self-
determination is given in the (personally discovered)
ability to kill oneself. In other words, self-inflicted
death cannot be performed without at least a minimal
sense of self-determination, inherent in the explicit
knowledge that it is yourself you are putting actively to
death;
4. Suicide can be experienced as personally justified in
the best way possible for this behaviour if a (unachiev-
able) way to conduct one’s life is also deemed worth
dying for. In other words: if it is the authentic thing to
do.
Discussion
In this paper I tried to describe the possible forms and
scopes of lived self-determination in suicidal mental life
from the first-person-perspective drawing on the phenom-
enological method. From these descriptions we can con-
clude that suicidal mental life neither offers the experience
of being fully autonomous, nor the experience of complete
heteronomy. In fact, as the phenomenological description
demonstrated, a person cannot decide to suicide without
having a, at least, minimal sense of self-determination.
In a certain sense, this seems to be a trivial statement.
Every suicide is, per definition, at least minimally self-
determined, because self-killing is about oneself. It cannot,
however, be taken for granted that this fact is acknowl-
edged by everyone. At least, it is not taken for granted if
adopting, for example, a strictly medical attitude or a
religious attitude in which killing oneself is deemed to have
nothing to do with self-determination, or is the far craziest
thing you could ever do. To acknowledge this fact of a
minimal sense of self-determination does, furthermore,
imply to acknowledge another, maybe even similarly
trivial fact: this personally discovered option to ‘pull the
plug’ strips desperation of its most despairing feature,
which is utmost helplessness. In other words: the knowl-
edge of this personally discovered option sustains and
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supports a desperate person, because it offers a second
possibility besides simply enduring desperation. It is this
sense, in which Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) wrote in
Beyond the good and the bad: ‘‘The thought of suicide is a
great comfort: it helps one to get through a bad night’’
(1994, III, Statement 157). If reframed from a phenome-
nological point of view, we could say that it is the possi-
bility to perform the suicidal act freely, if intended, which
is administering a minimal kind of freedom to suicidal
mental life as compared to a desperate mental life. This
freedom is, on the one hand, located on the level of
intentional action; on the other hand, it is also a freedom of
the will, because the possible goal of killing oneself was
simply not given before being discovered by the pertinent
person herself. Obviously, as we can conclude, this very
trivial thing is a very complex phenomenon, at least from a
phenomenological vantage point. It is therefore not simply
a question of how we define the term suicide, but just the
reverse: the definition of suicide as intentional self-killing
would be incomplete, and obviously contrary to our human
lifeworlds, if ‘intentional’ would be understood only in the
way of a self-conscious volition. Instead, it is indicating the
relationship between the experiencing subject and its
experienced object; insofar, it also indicates pre-reflective
qualities of our relatedness to our world.
The discovery of one’s ability to kill oneself is, there-
fore, not only the starting point for being suicidal. It is also
a non-axiological property of the object ‘intentional self-
killing’, which can be pre-reflectively valued in different
ways. It can be valued, for example, as unattractive,
seducing, relieving, premature, liberating, immoral, inef-
fective, horrifying, or even as attractive. The pre-reflective
valuing of the object ‘intentional self-killing’ is, as has
been argued above, prescribed by our momentarily state of
mind. If, for example, being humorous and delighted, it is
difficult to think about suicide as a beautiful and liberating
behavioural option. If, however, being in a desperate state
of mind, a state which is self-consciously valued and
judged as unbearable and unchangeable, suicide can appear
to be the only autonomous and relieving act achievable.
Even if the suicidal person takes her desperation as the
necessary condition for experiencing her suicide as a pos-
sible rescue or relief into account, the experienced attrac-
tiveness of one’s suicide as rescue or remedy does not
vanish. For example, if you tell a depressed person that her
helplessness and hopelessness is a typical symptom of her
mental illness and that a reasonable treatment can in fact
improve her mental condition, this need not lift her spirit. If
she, for example, thinks of suicide as her only true remedy,
her pre-reflective valuings of ‘intentional self-killing’ as
relieving will hence remain completely unchanged. In
other words, the various forms and scopes of lived self-
determination in suicidality basically rely on this crucial
feature of a minimal sense of self-determination inherent in
intentional self-killing.
In an equal fashion, the possible scopes of lived self-
determination in suicidal mental life are limited on the
opposite side, on the side of fuller autonomy. The main
limitation, besides being prescribed in one’s pre-reflective
valuings by one’s actual state of mind, is the impossibility
to re-evaluate one’s suicidal behaviour retrospectively.
This impossibility is well known by suicidal people and
marks the major difficulty to identify with one’s pre-
reflective valuing of suicide as attractive and so forth. The
suicidal person’s awareness of this fundamental limitation
makes understandable, why killing oneself is often not a
hasty decision. The pertinent person’s musings, whether it
is indeed the right time to kill oneself or if some other
option to alter one’s unbearable desperation might still be
available, becomes therefore a question of authenticity. In
other words, because you cannot give your behaviour
second thoughts once you have done it, you should achieve
the best decision not only for now, but for all times. This
lives up to the motto: ‘Your decision should better be
authentic.’ This style of how this situation, in which the
suicidal person is called upon to decide, is disclosed indi-
cates that the decision to kill oneself can be experienced as
self-determined in the highest way possible, only if one’s
own death can also be claimed to be in line with one’s
deepest commitments. That way it becomes, in the eyes of
the suicidal person, a sacrifice for one’s highest valued way
of life-conduct; which is, in a certain sense, a very plato-
nian way of suicide.
Our phenomenological descriptions support actual eth-
ical considerations in philosophical debates which reach
the same, platonian limit. Battin, maybe the leading phi-
losopher in this field of medical ethics, claims that a suicide
should only be called ‘rational’ if ‘‘dying accords with
one’s most fundamental interests and commitments’’
(1996, p. 115). Similarly, Cholbi claims that a person’s
suicide could only be called ‘rational’ if it is ‘‘a reflection
of her true self’’ (2008). As Battin pointed out recently, we
need to be aware of the difficulties to argue this claim
sufficiently in real life. A support for rationality of a per-
son’s suicide can only be possible if there is, ‘objectively’,
no chance to get better or avoid pain and suffering in any
other way (Battin 2010). She especially calls for further
insights into the lived experience of people in these situa-
tions; a call, I tried to take up in this paper.
The insights into the various scopes and forms of lived
self-determination in suicidal mental life – which has been
delivered here in phenomenological terms from the first-
person-perspective – could also be helpful for coping with
a past suicide-crisis and for people who lost loved ones
through suicide (so called ‘survivors of suicide’). It should
at least be of help for professionals in their daily work,
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because it offers a profound understanding of a crucial
aspect of suicidal mental life.
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